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Cotting: RICO's Conspiracy Agreement Requirement: A Matter of Semantics?

NOTE
RICO'S CONSPIRACY AGREEMENT

REQUIREMENT: A MATTER OF SEMANTICS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act' ("RICO") has been fraught with problems. RICO was
enacted by the federal government as part of title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act,2 in an effort to combat the increasing
threat of organized crime in modern society. However, RICO may not
have met this goal, as commentators have constantly criticized
RICO's ambiguity and overbreadth. Recently, attacks have been made
on the constitutionality of RICO, creating further doubt over whether
the government overstepped its bounds in its zealous effort to combat
organized crime.3

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
3. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), not followed by Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990), for Justice
Scalia's dissent which suggests that all of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") is void because it does not set forth clearly enough the crimes for which an
individual may be convicted. See, e.g., David W. Gartenstein and Joseph F. Warganz, Note,
RICO'S "Pattern" Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1990). This
issue was also raised previously by the courts, and many circuits have determined that the
Act is not unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2009 (1991); United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 42 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 428 (1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246,
1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d
472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Capetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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The attacks against RICO are primarily directed at the civil por-

tions of the Act in that they seem to be punishing criminal acts without the stringent requirements of the criminal process. This is because
the predicate acts involved in the civil litigation are criminal acts and
the forfeiture and treble damages provisions appear to be punitive
measures (as opposed to merely compensatory measures). 4 These
challenges raise concerns as to whether some of the provisions, as applied, violate an individual's constitutional rights.5 Aside from the
questions surrounding the Act's legality, there are still unanswered
questions as to how RICO is to be applied. This Note will focus on
the troubling question as to what a co-conspirator must agree to in

order to fall under the scope of RICO liability. It will begin with a
brief history of the issue, followed by a short history of RICO's legislative background. This Note will then address the actual conflict in
a circuit by circuit survey, and conclude with a proposed approach
that the Supreme Court should adopt, if and when it chooses to decide the issue.
II.

WHAT MUST A CO-CONSPIRATOR AGREE TO:
THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE

Although RICO was passed in 1970, it was not until the middle
to late 1970s that the courts began to receive large numbers of RICO
claims. The various circuit courts, in attempting to interpret the legislative intent behind RICO, created a number of serious inconsistencies
among themselves. One such inconsistency is what a co-conspirator

4.

See generally PAUL

A. BATISTA & MARK S. RHODES.

CiviL RICO PRACTICE

MANUAL 113-14 (2d ed. Supp. 1992); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understating and Transcending the Criminal--Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); Robert T. Hawkes, Note. The
Conflict Over RICO's Private Treble Damages Action, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 902, 934 (1985);
Dawn T. Trabeau, Note, HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.: Another Contribution
to RICO Confusion, 50 LA. L. REv. 1219, 1230-31 (1990).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). This case involved the
question of whether the forfeiture provisions had the effect of violating the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. By seizing all assets that were arguably the profits from illegal ventures, the
defendant was not able to afford the lawyer of his choice. The Supreme Court upheld the
forfeiture provisions as constitutional, and said that the Sixth Amendment was not violated as
it only guarantees a right to counsel, which the defendant had in this instance, it did not
guarantee his right to the counsel of his choice.
6. This issue has been examined only once before in the law reviews. See James C.
Minnis, Note, Clarifying RICO's Conspiracy Provision: Personal Commitment Not Required,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1399 (1988). However, this article essentially addresses only one side of the
argument, the side holding that personal agreement is not necessary.
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must have agreed to do in order to be charged with violating the
RICO conspiracy provision.7 Currently, there exists within the circuits
two differing approaches. The first approach will be referred to as the
"narrow" approach and the second approach will be referred to as the
"broad" approach.
The first approach is termed the narrow approach because it
places a higher burden of proof on the government. It is most clearly
set out in United States v. Winter.8 It requires that the co-conspirator
personally agree to commit two predicate acts.9 This does not mean
that the acts actually have to be committed, but that the government
must be able to prove that the individual's involvement extended to
more than one specific instance.1 t This approach has been adopted
by only by the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits. 1
The broad approach was first enunciated in United States v.
Carter.t2 In this approach the co-conspirator must only agree that
two acts be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 3 He need
not agree to commit the acts himself, but merely that the acts be
done by someone.1 4 The result of this approach is that the applicability of the Act is extended to cover those who cannot be convicted
for committing an actual illegal act, but are liable solely because they
joined an enterprise whose goal was to commit these illegal acts.
They are liable as conspirators in the most basic sense of the term.
This approach is currently followed by seven other circuits. The
Fifth Circuit is arguably an eighth circuit which follows the broad
approach, although it employs different language than the other cir-

§

7. An individual charged with a RICO conspiracy is charged under 18 U.S.C.
1962(d) which reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate

any provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section:'
At the outset it must be clearly pointed out that the controversy arises in only a
small number of cases. This is because in the majority of RICO cases the government can
generally attribute numerous criminal acts to each conspirator. Therefore, the problem only

surfaces in smaller RICO cases or with fringe members of a conspiracy. This may also
account for the refusal of the Supreme Court to decide what the standard is, because it is
only a peripheral concern within the larger framework of RICO.
8. 663 F.2d 1120, (lst Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).

9.

ld.

10. Id.at 1136.
11. See United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
12. 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 819 (1984).

13. Id.at 1528-31.
14. ld.This obviously does not preclude proof that he agreed to commit the acts
himself. The more proof the government can provide the stronger the case. This issue focuses
more upon the threshold level or required proof.
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cuits."

The inconsistency between the two views creates an issue primarily because the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to a
case dealing with this issue, although convicted defendants have petitioned on numerous occasions.16 The first notable request on this
issue was in Adams v. United States.17 In this case Justice White
dissented from the denial of certiorari because there was an inconsistency among the circuits and he believed that the Supreme Court
should resolve the split.' 8 Resolution of this conflict would mean
that only one standard would be applied in situations of this type.
While there may have been valid reasons for denying certiorari at that
time, subsequent petitions have also been denied. 9 The most striking

15. See United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978), which states that to be convicted an individual "by his words or by his actions, must
have objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of
an enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes." This language is
diametrically opposed to the language found in United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489,
498 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986), which says that "a RICO conspiracy
requires only an agreement to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Under this approach it is only necessary that the defendant
agree to the commission of the two predicate acts on behalf of the conspiracy." The Fifth
Circuit approach could be interpreted to mean that an individual who only indirectly agrees
to participate in the activities of the enterprise may be one who only agrees to the commission of two or more predicate acts, as required by the second approach. Neither would
restrict the applicability of the statute to those defendants who personally agreed to commit
two predicate acts.
16. See United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 305
(1990); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988);
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986);
Adams v. United States, 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United
States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v.
Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v.
Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v.
Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
17. 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).
18. Id.
19. Some commentators say that the Supreme Court has correctly denied taking this
issue up on certiorari. See Michael J. Broyde, Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived
Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985
Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 610 (1987). The author cites four requirements for a case to be
heard by the Supreme Court. These are: 1) "the cases in conflict must be from the final
courts in their jurisdictions"; 2) "the conflict may not be based on dicta or alternative holdings"; 3) "the issue raised before the Supreme Court must have been raised before the lower
courts that heard the case, and either petitioner or respondent must raise the issue in its brief
to the Supreme Court"; and 4) "the legal issue must also be relevant to the petitioner's
claim." Id. at 620. An additional requirement is that the issue be of one that is of importance to the litigants themselves, and not merely future litigants, meaning that a favorable
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recent request is found in United States v. Ptyba,20 where the petition was again denied without explanation by the Court,2' but not
without dissent. Justice White dissented from the denial of certiorari
and asserted, yet again, that this issue should be resolved.2 2 In fact,
he made a direct reference to his previous dissent on the issue in the
Adams case.2 In spite of Justice White's dissents and the numerous
cases that have petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, to date
the Court has not yet decided this issue, nor has it accepted a case in
which this issue arises.

M. A BRIEF

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

RICO

In understanding what the purposes and goals of RICO are, it is
important to know the background surrounding the passage of the

decision will change the outcome in their case. If they have satisfied both standards and are
just challenging the validity of the stricter standard the court can refuse to hear the case. The
Supreme Court is not required to provide the lower courts with a more succinct interpretation. It is in this category that Adams v. United States, 474 U.S. 971 (1985), fell. The issue
was not correctly raised because the defendant would have been convicted under either of the
standards, and so while there was a conflict between the circuits on an issue that appeared
ripe for review, the court was correct in denying the writ of certiorari.
20. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990).
21. While it is not usual for the Supreme Court to give its reasons for denial of a
petition of a writ of certiorari, the result can sometimes indicate that it agree with the
decision below. This is somewhat troubling in this instance because one is left unsure of
what the Court might be agreeing to. It could be saying that it agrees that the conviction
should stand, or it could be saying that it agrees with the result. If the latter is the true
interpretation then the Court is allowing two circuits to disregard the "correct" test to be used
to decide this issue. By not granting certiorari and making a final decision on the issue the
Court is allowing the First and Second circuits the right to thwart justice. If, however, it is
not the test that the Court agrees with, but rather the result, it would still appear that the
Court would have the responsibility to decide what the true test is. Especially if it does not
agree with the test being used, because the challenges are being made in favor of the more
strict test, and if this is not the correct test, defendants are being convicted in at least eight
of the circuits on the incorrect standard. This would suggest that some of those convictions
were not proper.
For a more thorough analysis of what role the Court should take, see Broyde, supra
note 19.
22. 111 S. CL at 305.
23. Id. The essence of his dissent was that the Supreme Court had a duty to hear this
issue because of the conflicting results in the circuit courts. He stated that due to the differing results it mattered a great deal in which circuit charges were brought against you because
in one the government had a much higher burden and you were more likely to be acquitted.
In the other the burden was much lower and as a result convictions would occur more
frequently in those circuits. The Supreme Court was supposed to settle the issue and thus
would determine if too many individuals were not being punished or whether they were
being unjustly punished.
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Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970.
A.

The Factual Background of RICO

In 1963, a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations held hearings about the scope and depth of organized crime in
American society. 4 Their inquiry continued into 1964 through further investigation of illicit traffic in narcotics,'s and its results were
reviewed by the Committee on Government Operations.26 The focus
of the review was directed primarily towards the testimony given by
Joseph Valachi, a former Mafia figure who turned government's witness.27 Valachi was the first key figure directly involved in La Cosa
Nostra, the organization more commonly known as the Mafia, to turn
government's witness.2 8 He provided the government with detailed
information on the workings, makeup, and extent to which the
Mafia's activities penetrated into ordinary society. This information
revealed that the Mafia was more entrenched in American society
than Congress had first suspected.29 The ultimate finding of these
hearings, and many others, was that organized crime was infiltrating
legitimate businesses and governmental bodies throughout America, 0
and the current laws did not adequately provide for a means to combat this infiltration."

24. See SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, SUBCOMMrrTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965) [hereinafter ORGANIZED CRIME].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See supra note 24. The report consists primarily of the detailed information that
Valachi was able to give the government: names, dates, crimes, types of businesses infiltrated.
It is a very fact-specific report and in essence tells a story as opposed to findings of an
administrative body.
For those interested in studying the workings of the Mafia it is a very valuable report
as it indicates what its main characteristics are and its basic structure, which in turn shows
how so many top individuals in the Mafia are not successfully prosecuted. This is because
the orders filter down through the ranks and the lower branches have the responsibility to
protect their superiors, and so the newer members tend to incur substantially all criminal
liability for many of the crimes ordered by the members higher up.
30. See, e.g., PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200-09 (1967).
31. See ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 24, at 3. There were several reasons given for
the failure of the municipal agencies to deal with these problems. These include: lack of
jurisdiction, lack of resources, lack of talent, insulation of criminal leaders, inadequate substantive laws at the state level, and failure to impose available sanctions. What was needed
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B. The Introduction of the Act
In 1967, ,Senator Roman L. Hruska introduced legislation to
combat the forces of organized crime.3 2 The focus of this legislation
was to utilize new techniques to combat organized crime.33 It was
not passed, however, as a consensus could not be reached on the
appropriate means to combat this previously, underestimated force in
American society. 4
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1969 was proposed by
Senator McClellan.35 The initial version of the Act, however, did not
contain the RICO provision, nor anything that was remotely similar to
it.36 Additionally, this version, which was later to become RICO, did
not adequately deal with the key problem, the infiltration of organized
crime into American society.37 Shortly after its introduction, a replacement bill was introduced by Senators Hruska and Stevens.38
This bill dealt primarily with prohibiting the use of money acquired
or "earned" by illegal means to further interests in legal organizations.3 9 This bill was also rejected, because, like many of its fore-

was a national measure that would enable the local police forces to act in conjunction with
the federal government. Included in this was also the need for comprehensive legislation that
provided for means directly aimed at dealing with this new threat. Id.
32. Senator Hruska proposed bills S. 2048 and S. 2049 at this time to meet the evils
described in the Presidents Report, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
33. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennet v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 253 (1982). Included was the suggestion that
antitrust theories be utilized. This would create a novel way to fight takeovers of legitimate
American businesses.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 257. This was referred to in the debates as S. 30.
36. See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO,
65 IOWA L. REv. 837, 839 (1980).
37. Id.
38. See Blakey, supra note 33, at 258. The bill, S. 1623, was called the Criminal
Activities Profits Act and was officially introduced on March 20, 1969. The intention of this
bill was to focus the attempts of Senator McClellan.
39. Bradley, supra note 36, at 841. The bill was focused on prohibiting investment of
funds. It also created treble damages and injunctive relief. Treble damages managed to
survive the changes that this bill underwent and now are the focus of much controversy. See
Chen, supra note 4, at 1325 (discussing governmental use of RICO to punish "criminals"
financially); Hawkes. supra note 4, at 902 (discussing how litigants in consumer fraud cases
may potentially apply RICO to obtain treble damages); S. Gregg Kunzi, Sedima and Bankers
Trust: Second Circuit Delivers a Mortal Blow to Private Civil RICO Actions, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 909 (1985) (discussing the various interpretations of the treble damages provisions);
Judith A. Morse, Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterizationand Computation, 61
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 526 (1986) (discussing treble damages and the ways and situations in
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runners, it was too narrow and did not provide adequate means to
deal with the problem.' Instead, it was only applicable to a small
group of individuals and thus did not accomplish the far-reaching
purposes which were sought after.41 The debates surrounding the
bills thus far introduced resulted in the introduction by Senators
42
Hruska and McClellan of S. 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act.
This bill, while relying heavily on the antitrust laws, as did the first
bill introduced, did not contain a provision for treble damages. 43 Its
goal was not to interfere with existing remedies but to provide the
government with additional means to combat the problem. 44 Through
amendments and compromise
this bill became title IX of the Orga45
nized Crime Control Act.
C.

The Stated Purpose of the Act

The purpose of title IX is "the elimination of the infiltration of

organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operat-

ing in interstate commerce." 46 It attempts to reach these goals by
fashioning new criminal and civil punishments with which to punish
members of organized crime.47 While the new civil remedies are
extensive, this Note focuses primarily on the criminal provisions

which they are awarded).
40. Bradley, supra note 36, at 841.
41. Id. at 840. The bills only dealt with one method by which infiltration occurred,
investment. The report stated that there were four methods
by which organized crime gained control of legitimate businesses had been identified in 1967 by a presidential task force: investing concealed profits acquired from
gambling and other illegal enterprises; accepting business interests in payment of
the owner's gambling debts; foreclosing on usurious loans; and using various forms
of extortion.
Id.
42. Blakey, supra note 33, at 262.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 262-63. It is important to remember that the goals of the government were
not only to establish means by which these individuals could be caught and prosecuted
criminally, but they were also supposed to be a means of civil redress. This was so that the
individuals hurt by the actions of organized crime could recoup some of their losses and
hopefully continue on with their businesses. In fact, RICO today is used primarily as a civil
means. This is not to say that no criminal actions are brought under RICO, but that the
citizens have made great use of the civil provisions.
45. Bradley, supra note 36, at 843. The bill passed the Senate on January 23, 1970 and
passed the House on October 7, 1970, with only minor changes, and was again approved by
the Senate on October 12, 1970. It was signed into law on October 15, 1970.
46.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969,

S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
47. Id. at 78-79.
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which are codified in title 18 §§ 1961-1963. 48 Section 1961 is the
definitional section, providing definitions of conduct which is punishable under the statute.49 The heart of the statute is § 1962, which
provides in detail what activities are prohibited by the Act.50 The
last criminal section is § 1963, which deals solely with the penalties
for violating any of the provisions in § 1962. The remaining sections, §§ 1964-1968, contain the civil provisions of the statute.5
D.

The Debates Over the Act

In the debates and hearings, the definition of what conduct

would be included as a criminal act under §§ 1961-1962 was not

48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963.
49. Id. § 1961.
50. Id. § 1962. Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of any unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer,
or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
51. Id. § 1963. This Note will not be considering this section at all as the inquiry is
focused directly on what is necessary to obtain a conviction and not what occurs as a result
of the conviction.
52. Id. §§ 1964-1968. Although these sections provide the civil penalties, all penalties
are based on the acts listed in § 1962. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for articles
concerning the controversy surrounding this fact.
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subject to much debate, because that was not the primary focus of the
Organized Crime Control Act. The focus was on the remedy; Congress was not trying to create new classifications of criminal behavior.53 Therefore, it was relatively easy for the members of Congress
to decide what crimes it was going to punish and what constituted a
violation of the Act, as opposed to creating a new definition of criminal conduct. The main points of contention arose mainly in the areas
of criminal punishment and the civil provisions.' The end result
was that the courts had little guidance in determining what was meant
by many of the criminal sections, § 1962(d) in particular. 55 The
courts were left largely to their own means to determine what was
required by the Act in order to be guilty of conspiring to violate any
of the activities specified in the Act. This lack of guidance is the
direct cause that created the issue in question: what must a co-conspirator agree to in order to be held liable under § 1962(d) of the
Act?
IV.

THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AMONG
THE CIRCUITS: A CLOSER LOOK

As stated above, there appears to be two basic interpretations of
what a co-conspirator must agree to, the narrow approach and the
broad approach.56 This section will first analyze the narrow approach
and the analysis employed by the circuit courts utilizing this approach. The focus will then shift to the broad approach and the analysis of law employed by those courts that have used this approach.
Lastly, this section will focus on the slight deviation adopted by the
Fifth Circuit to determine whether it is significant.
A.

The Narrow Approach

The narrow approach is so named because it establishes a higher
burden of proof borne by the government in proving its case: the
government is required to produce evidence that meets very limited
and specific requirements. The narrow approach requires the government to prove that an individual personally agreed to commit two or
more predicate acts.57 This approach was first enunciated by the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
See generally Bradley, supra note 36.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
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First Circuit in United States v. Winter,58 and is currently followed
by two other circuits, the Second and Tenth. Although the standard is
the same, each circuit has dealt with the issue in a slightly different
manner. It is these individual approaches that this Note will explore
below.
1. The First Circuit Approach
In Winter, the First Circuit was faced with a case of first impression. 9 In formulating its decision, it relied heavily on the decision
in United States v. Elliot.' The court's analysis, however, went one
step further. Elliot had established the following as the appropriate
test:
[t]o be convicted as a member of an enterprise conspiracy, an individual, by his words or actions, must have objectively manifested an
agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an
enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate
crimes."
At issue in Winter was whether the government must prove that
the individual personally agreed to the commission of two predicate
acts or whether it must prove that the individual personally committed
two predicate acts.62 The court framed its decision on the basis of
federal conspiracy law, as opposed to RICO conspiracy law. Federal
conspiracy law, as enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 371, does not require
the requisite act to be committed, but merely requires that some action be taken towards the goal of the conspiracy. 3 The Winter court

U.S. 1011 (1983).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1136.
60. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
61. Il at 903. This test was not taken any further at that time and was a very broad
test, with very little definition to it. It did not answer the question of what constitutes "manifesting an agreement," which is exactly what courts using this case have been attempting to
establish.
62. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1136. The government in this case was obviously arguing for
the lesser approach, that the individual must agree to personally commit two or more predicate acts, as opposed to actually committing the two acts. This argument focuses on the
words and the directly portions of the test in Elliot, 571 F.2d at 903. The defendants, on the
other hand, focused on the actions and directly portions of the test. Id. Neither focused on
whether the government could establish their burden by proving that the individual indirectly
manifested his agreement through words or actions.
63. United States v. Cruz, 568 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1978). The holding was that all that
was needed for a conspiracy was proof of an agreement, not proof of the substantive crime.
This, however, would not be enough to convict an individual of the substantive crime under

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:725

held that
a RICO conspiracy count must charge as a minimum that each
defendant agreed to commit two or more specified predicate crimes
in addition to charging an agreement to participate in the conduct of
affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activian 6"enterprise's"
4
ty.,

The First Circuit has, in subsequent years, further defined what
constitutes sufficient conduct to support a charge of RICO conspiracy.
In United States v. Anguilo,65 the First Circuit tailored the standard
it previously articulated in Winter.66 In Anguilo, the comparison to
federal conspiracy law was again utilized, with the court focusing on
the requirement for overt actions. "Overt actions" was defined as an
actual manifestation towards realization of the goals of the conspiracy.67 The First Circuit held that "the commission of 'overt acts' is
not required for a RICO conspiracy conviction., 68 This decision was
based on the language of the statute itself. The court held that a plain
reading of the statute does not include a requirement for overt acts,
nor even a mention of them. 69 The Anguilo court, therefore, cleared
up any lingering doubts as to the necessity of overt acts, but adhered
to its previous requirement that the defendant must have personally
agreed to commit two predicate acts.70
normal conspiracy law. In order to prove the substantive crime the government would need
proof that the individual committed the crime.
64. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1136.
65. 847 F.2d 956 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988).
66. Id. at 964.
67. Id.
68. d In doing so the court broadened its approach. By not requiring overt acts by the
members charged, it was sufficient that the defendants personally agreed to commit two acts,
and the government need not prove that they had actually taken any steps towards committing those acts. As a general rule, in most RICO cases the government has at least one
member of the enterprise that will testify against the others and this is how it proves what
the others said to each other.
In making this decision the court joined other circuits which had already decided that
overt acts were not necessary. See United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (lth Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
69. Anguilo, 847 F.2d at 964. The court held, "[s]ince section 1962(d) does not, itself,
require overt acts, there is no reason for us to imply such a requirement." However, the
requirement of two predicate acts is also not found in this section of the statute. It is found
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), which says that to prove the existence of a conspiracy there must
be two or more predicate acts. The courts have applied this to the conspiracy provision as
well. This seems somewhat strange in that in conspiracy law all that is needed is one act. 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
70. Anguilo, 847 F.2d at 964; see also United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230. 241 (Ist
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2. The Second Circuit Approach
The Second Circuit also follows the approach of the First Circuit. It decided the issue for the first time in 1984, just one year after
the First Circuit decided Winter.7" However, the vagueness of the
opinions and lack of clear guiding rules evidences a strong reluctance
on its part to deal with the issue at an earlier date.72
The case law indicates that the Second Circuit has chosen not to
employ an identically phrased test as employed by the First Circuit.
The test it adopted was set out in United States v. Ruggiero.7 3 While
not utilizing the word "personally," Ruggiero clearly endorses the
view that the government must show that the defendant personally
agreed to the commission of two predicate acts, not that he merely
agreed that the acts be committed.7 4 Instead, the Second Circuit
maintains that the defendant must agree to participate in two predicate
acts, intimating that personal participation is inherent in the agreement.75

Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 139 (1990); United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 528
(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989).
71. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984).
72. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840
(1983); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). It
appears that the issue in both of these cases focused on other concerns. In Barton, the
concern was over whether the government could impose consecutive sentences for a conspiracy charge and a RICO conspiracy charge, even though there was only one agreement. Barton,
647 F.2d at 234. The court held that it was proper and that it even established two separate
offenses. Id. at 237. In Bagaric the concern was over whether the enterprise or the pattern of
racketeering acts needed to produce financial gain. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 55. Also contested
was the jury instruction, defendants argued that the judge below had not sufficiently separated
the requirement of the predicate offenses from the conspiracy. Id. at 62. The court held that
the jury instruction did. The language used to describe what the defendant must do is as
follows: "'that is,that the defendant conspired to commit at least two acts or threats . . .in
aid of racketeering in the course of the activities of the enterprise."' Id. This clearly can be
read as requiring that the defendant to have personally agreed to the acts, without explicitly
stating so.
73. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 913.
74. Id. at 923. The instruction the judge gave was "that to find a particular defendant
guilty of the RICO conspiracy they would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
willfully participated in at least two of the conspiracies alleged as predicate offenses." Id.
75. See United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986). The guideline to be used
in these cases is "'to convict on a RICO conspiracy [the government] must prove that
defendant himself at least agreed to commit two or more predicate acts."' Id. at 613 (quoting
Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 921). The judge interpreted this in Teitler to mean, "It]he defendant
must have agreed to assist in at least nvo of the predicate acts he or she is accused of
committing. This means that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an
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While the test utilized is easily discernable, there does not appear
to be any discernable reason or reasons why the Second Circuit
adopted this test, as opposed to any other test. In fact, the case law

does not indicate an awareness that an almost identical test was being
utilized in another circuit.
Interestingly enough, the Second Circuit in United States v.

Persico,76 made an observation that § 1962(d) only requires an
agreement to join the conspiracy, not an agreement to commit two or
more predicate acts.7' Despite the relevancy of the observation to the
issue at hand, the court held that the government must produce proof
that the defendant agreed to commit two or more predicate acts to
charge him with a RICO conspiracy. 7 The decision is confusing because the Second Circuit stated that it was analyzing the RICO conspiracy statute in the same manner as it would any other conspiracy
79
statute, whereas its holding clearly proves that it was not.
The Second Circuit's approach is more confusing as it follows
the majority of circuits in holding that the RICO conspiracy statute
does not require proof of overt acts, which is a requirement of the
federal conspiracy statute.80 The confusion is intensified because the
federal conspiracy statute only requires an agreement and some overt
act by one member of the conspiracy towards the furtherance of the

goal to find culpability for all members, not action by each of the
participants. 8

agreement to commit two charged predicate crimes." Id. at 614. This clearly has the same
effect as saying that the defendant must personally agree to commit two predicate crimes. See
also United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1989).
76. 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
77. Id. at 713.
78. Id. The court held that:
[a]lthough proof of a RICO conspiracy requires a demonstration that a defendant
agreed to commit two or more predicate acts, rather than a simple showing that
the defendant agreed to join the conspiracy, the agreement proscribed by section
1962(d) is conspiracy to participate in a charged enterprise's affairs, not conspiracy
to commit predicate acts.
ld.
79. "We perceive no valid reason why the RICO conspiracy statute should be analyzed
in a manner inconsistent with other conspiracy statutes not requiring proof of overt acts." Id.
at 713. This indicates that the agreement of a defendant to commit two predicate crimes is
the overt act required, as opposed to any steps taken. This in itself is interesting as this
circuit has also held that overt acts are not required by RICO. Id.; see also United States v.
Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
80. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d
1120, 1124 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). It
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3. The Tenth Circuit Approach
The Tenth Circuit recently joined the ranks of the First and
Second Circuits. The issue first arose in United States v. Killip,82 but
was summarily disposed of by the court. The issue was not dealt
with again until 1991 in United States v. Sanders." The court at this
juncture also dealt with the issue in a highly superficial manner. The
court noted that the issue had not been decided, that it needed to be
decided, and held that it would decide it, even though it was not
briefed, and then it summarily picked an approach." Its continued
adherence to its hastily set forth standard is questionable as it expressly stated that "this issue may be ripe for reconsideration at a
future time . . . upon an opportunity for fuller briefing by the parties." 86 This tends to indicate that the Second Circuit did not fully
consider the two differing approaches, nor an approach of its own,
but merely adopted the one that had been applied by the district court

below.
B.

The Broad Approach

The broad approach is currently followed by seven, and arguably
eight, of the other circuits and is thus easier to analyze.87 Moreover,
in some instances the circuit courts have given the reasoning they utilized for choosing one approach over the other. The analysis in this
section will proceed in a circuit by circuit fashion, starting with the
seems plausible that an agreement to commit two predicate acts might be the overt act, and
then no steps towards this goal need be proven. Another approach is to look at the agreement to join the conspiracy as just that, the agreement. Any further agreements, such as
agreeing that two acts be committed, would also satisfy the overt act requirement. This view
does not require the defendant to personally agree to commit the acts, just that the acts are
committed. This agreement is not inherent in the agreement to join the conspiracy, that is
just that you want to join and you believe in the goals, not that you want any part in them.
82. 819 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir. 1987).
83. Id The issue was not decided by the court because the trial judge had used the
"personally must commit" language below. The 'court noted that it had been previously
undecided, but choose instead not to deal with it. "This court has not decided the issue, but
because of the trial court's instructions in this case, we do not reach it here." Id at 1548.
84. 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 1473. The court dealt with the entire issue in two short paragraphs. It cited a
case from each side and then stated that it could not dismiss the issue as it did previously
in United States v. Killip. The court then stated, "we adopt the rule of law that the defendant must agree to personally commit two predicate acts, not merely agree to the commission
of two predicate offenses by an conspirator." Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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Third Circuit.
1. The Third Circuit
The issue of what a co-conspirator must agree to arose in the
Third Circuit at the same time the First Circuit was deciding the
issue. The Third Circuit first dealt with this issue in United States v.
Boffa.88 Working from the standard established by the First Circuit
in United States v. Winter,89 the defendants argued that the government must show that each individual defendant personally agreed to
commit two predicate acts. It too based its analysis upon United
States v. Elliot.90 The Third Circuit evaded the issue at this time on
the basis that the jury charge was substantially similar to the one
given in Elliot and, therefore, there was no need for further clarification of the standard at this point.9 The issue returned, however, in
United States v. Riccobene,92 but was again cleverly evaded. 93 The
court held that "[a]n agreement merely to commit the predicate offenses would not be sufficient to support a RICO conspiracy. Nor is
it sufficient if the defendants merely participate in the same enterprise,"" which seemed to indicate that both an agreement to participate in the enterprise and an agreement to commit predicate offenses
were required.
The issue was not resolved until United States v. Adams.9 The
Third Circuit, clearly aware of its past delinquency, noted that it had
not directly dealt with the issue before, but that it had been dealt
with in other circuits with conflicting results. 96
88. 688 F.2d 919 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
89. 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
90. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
91. The jury charge stated that:
in order to convict a defendant of a RICO conspiracy, [the jury] must conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant, with knowledge of the conspiracy,
willfully became a member of that conspiracy by agreeing to participate directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity ...."
Boffa, 688 F.2d at 937 (quoting the jury instructions of the district court).
92. 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 224; see, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) (following Riccobene).
95. 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).
96. Il at 1116. Compare United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31 (11th Cir.)
(personal commission not required), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982) (personal commission not required), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983) with United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.)
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The Third Circuit, in finally resolving the controversy, held that
the "defendant must agree only to the commission of the predicate
acts, and need not agree to commit personally those acts." 97 It based
its decision primarily upon the analysis given by the Eleventh Circuit
9 8 It also held that the statutory language
in United States v. Carter.
did not require personal agreement, and further held that reading
RICO in a narrow fashion defeated the purposes of the statute, which
was intended to be far reaching. 99 Although this case created a direct conflict within the circuits, it was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.'0 The view espoused by the court in Adams, however, has consequentially been consistently followed by the Third Circuit.10 ' It has not been followed blindly, however. The Third Circuit
has displayed a willingness to reconsider the issue at some point if
there was a clear demonstration that justice required it.' 0 2
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has been very quiet on this issue, and has
only very recently addressed the issue in United States v. Pryba.03

(personal commission required), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Winter,
663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981) (personal commission required), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983).
97. Adams, 759 F.2d at 1116.
98. 721 F.2d 1514, 1528-31 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984). The analysis
was given by Judge Johnson.
99. Adams, 759 F.2d at 1116; see also United States v. Local 560, International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 331 (D.N.J. 1984), aft'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating
the goals of RICO).
100. United States v. Adams, 474 U.S. 971 (1985). A dissent was filed by Justice White
and Chief Justice Burger. Id. Justice White noted the differences in the circuits over what the
interpretation was, and drew attention to the fact that even the government itself could not
decide which was the proper test. He felt that this provided ample justification for the
Supreme Court accepting the case to resolve the dispute. Id.; see Broyde, supra note 19, and
accompanying text for possible reasons explaining why certiorari was denied.
101. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1130 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct 2009 (1991); United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211, 229 (3d Cir. 1990), vacated,
110 S. Ct. 3233 (1990); United States v. Triatz, 871 F.2d 368, 396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 821 (1989); United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied. 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp.,
829 F.2d 1263, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987).
102. See United States v. Triatz, 871 F.2d 368, 396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821
(1989). The court stated that "appellants have not proffered any justification for this Court to
change its current position. Accordingly, being bound by controlling precedent, we find that
appellants' argument must fail." Id. This indicates that the court is open to change, and, if
such proof was forthcoming, it would probably change the standard that it is now employing.
103. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990). It would be interesting
to know why this circuit has been so quiet, whether it is due to less RICO cases or whether
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The defendants on appeal argued that the trial court judge erred in
his instruction becatise the instruction did not require the government
to prove that each defendant personally agreed to commit two predicate acts, but instead allowed the jury to convict if they found that
each defendant agreed that two predicate acts would be committed." The Fourth Circuit held that the jury charge was correct, and
that the government was not required by law to prove anything
else."0 5 The Fourth Circuit focused its inquiry on what the RICO
conspiracy statute intended to prevent: an agreement to perform unlawful acts. 1°6 It held that a more stringent requirement would "add
an element to RICO conspiracy that Congress did not direct, and this
would be contrary to the majority of circuits which have decided the
issue."" °7 This case was also recently denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, and Justice White again dissented.' °8 Justice White's
dissent focused on the need for a resolution of this issue, indicating
that a decision was long overdue through reference to his 1984 dissent on this same issue."° The issue has not since been addressed
by the Fourth Circuit.
3. The Sixth Circuit
The broad standard was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Joseph t0 The Sixth Circuit, while not clearly detailing its
reasoning for adopting the broad approach, clearly indicates its agreement with the reasoning of other circuits adopting this approach."'

it has not arisen in this circuit yet. It did not appear it was consciously avoiding decision on
the issue.
104. Id. at 760. The charge was that to convict a defendant of a RICO conspiracy
charge the government had to prove:
What each defendant agreed to personally commit or aid and abet two or more
acts of racketeering in violation of Section 1962(a) or that each defendant agreed
that another co-conspirator would commit two or more acts of racketeering in
violation of 1962(a).
Id.
105. Id. at 760.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court then went on to cite numerous authorities on which it relied. The
citations have been omitted here because the cases used will be discussed, or have already
been, in this Note.
108. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990).
109. Id.; see Broyde, supra note 19, and accompanying text.
110. 781 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986).
111. Joseph, 781 F.2d at 568. The case relied on the three most widely cited cases for
this position: United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
971 (1985); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
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However, the Sixth Circuit held that "[flor a conspiracy conviction it
is not necessary to prove that the defendant agreed to personally
commit the requisite acts, but only that he agreed that another violate

§ 1962(c) by committing two acts of racketeering."'

While not ev-

er providing a clear explanation for adoption of this method, the
Sixth Circuit has consistently followed this decision, which indicate
its acceptance of it. It is interesting to note that while it has continued to employ the same standard, it has done so with varying lan13
guage.
4. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit is the first circuit to provide a detailed
assessment of the conflicting views of the circuits. The Seventh Circuit first considered the issue in United States v. Melton, n 4 but did
not adequately address it at that time. t5 The issue was not squarely
examined until 1986, in United States v. Neapolitan."t 6 The Seventh
Circuit then did what no other circuit had done: it examined the issue
in depth in its opinion, giving its reasoning and support for the decision.
The Seventh Circuit clearly spent a great deal of time and effort
to determine which test was correct, and thus which one it should
apply." 7 It began by laying out the two conflicting views, and then
determined which circuits were following each view." 8 Its research

U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
112. Joseph, 781 F.2d at 568.
113. See United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir. 1990). The court held
that "[d]efendant's agreement to participate in the RICO conspiracy may be inferred from
their acts; United States v. Joseph, 835 F.2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir. 1987) (inference drawn
from defendant's acts is sufficient evidence of an agreement to participate in the affairs of
the enterprise)." Id. This has the same meaning. While the latter does not expressly state the
above enunciated rule it is self-evident that you can draw a direct inference that the defendant agreed that two acts be committed, and that is enough to support a RICO conspiracy
charge, assuming that all other elements are met.
114. 689 F.2d 679 (1982).
115. Id. The court used that analysis employed in the Fifth Circuit, by using Elliot-like
language. The court employed United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 834 (5th Cir. 1980),
which says that "[to] be convicted of a conspiracy to violate RICO there must be proof that
the individual, by his words or actions, objectively manifested an agreement to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise, through the commission of two or more
of the predicate crimes." Melton, 689 F.2d at 683.
116. 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986).
117. Id. at 494-99.
118. Id. at 494.
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also indicated that not even the Department of Justice knew which
approach was correct, but had merely established what its approach
was." 9 Its analysis then focused on the rules of RICO construction:
how the statute has been read by the Supreme Court and the fact that
RICO is not a substantive statute, but merely a remedial statute. 20
Close attention was given to the analysis and reasoning of the Elev2
' This concluded the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Carter.1
2 2 Due to the lack of
approach.
of
the
broad
Circuit's
analysis
enth
analysis by the courts utilizing the narrow view, the Seventh Circuit
was compelled to complete the analysis of the theory of the First and
Second Circuits, since it had not been previously undertaken.'2
The conclusion reached after its extensive analysis was that the
Carter approach was the preferable approach and it adopted it as its

119. Id. at 494-95. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

72 (1985), stating, "as of mid-1985, it is the policy of the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section that every defendant in a proposed RICO conspiracy count must be shown to have
agreed personally to commit two or more racketeering acts." Id. This view has subsequently
changed. The new version now holds:
In view of the strong analysis in Neapolitan and because a majority of the circuits
have reached a similar conclusion, the Criminal Division, as of mid-1988, will
permit RICO conspiracy counts to allege that defendants agreed to be members of
the conspiracy and agreed to the commission of two or more predicate acts by
others on behalf of the conspiracy . . . . This policy, modified somewhat from the
first edition of this Manual, is subject to further development as the case law
evolves.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 89 (1988). This statement

strongly suggests that the Criminal Division does not have an opinion on what is the correct
interpretation, and that it will rely on majority rule.
120. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 495. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has
always read the statute in a broad manner, one whose focus is on the literal meaning. This
reading of course is based upon the express statement of the statute itself: "RICO is to be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947. The fact that it is a remedial statute is based upon the goal of the statute which is "to
seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States . . . by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in Organized Crime." Statement of Findings of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 923. No new crimes are created, but old ones are
redefined and the punishments are altered. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 495.
121. 721 F.2d 1514, 1529 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
122. Id. The court stated "[ifn contrast to Carter, the First and Second Circuits have,
without extensive analysis, adopted a requirement of agreement to personally to commit
predicate acts . . . . Because of the lack of an extensive development of the First and
Second Circuit approach the issue before this court is in a sense not well framed." Id. at
496-97.
123. Id. ai 497-98.
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own.24 This decision has great precedential strength due to the
lengthy analysis of the issue."z Additionally, other circuits have
utilized the extensive
analysis provided in determining which ap1 26
adopt.
to
proach
5. The Eighth Circuit
The decisions in the Eighth Circuit are limited as the issue was
not dealt with until 1987. The issue arose in the case of United
States v. Kragness, 27 which in turn relied heavily on United States
v. Neapolitan.128 The Eighth Circuit does not appear to have inde-

pendently analyzed this issue in depth, preferring instead to rely on
the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Neapolitan, in adopting the
"agreement only" test, as opposed to the "personal agreement"
test.' 29 Subsequent decisions endorse this view, also without much
analysis. For example, in United States v. Leisure,'30 the court summarily states that it had recently held that "a conviction for RICO
conspiracy 'requires only that each defendant agree to join the conspiracy."",13' The same approach was utilized in subsequent years as
well, 32 and will most likely to continue to be the standard.

6. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit first decided the issue in 1984, but was

124. Id. at 498. The language of the opinion is as follows:
We conclude, therefore, that a RICO conspiracy requires only an agreement to
conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Under this approach it is only necessary that the defendant agree to
the commission of the two predicate acts on behalf of the conspiracy.
Id. This is a two step approach and it requires that the individual 1) must "manifest his
agreement to the objective of a violation of RICO," and 2) he must have agreed to participate in the enterprise. This means that an individual who agreed to join the enterprise, but
did not agree to any predicate acts would not be guilty. Likewise, the individual who agreed
to the commission of two predicate acts, but did not agree to join the enterprise would also
not be guilty. Id. at 498-99.
125. See United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Stem,
858 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1986).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 860. The court specifically states that they are joining the majority approach,
and refers to Neapolitan.
129. Kragness, 830 F.2d at 860.
130. 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988).
131. Id. at 1367.
132. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co., 886 F.2d 986, 996-97 (8th Cir.
1989).
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strongly alluded to in United States v. Brooklier,'3 a 1982 case.
In Brooklier the Ninth Circuit was faced with the necessity of
defining the "essence of a RICO conspiracy," and determined that it
was the agreement to participate in the enterprise, not an agreement
to commit any acts." They stated later in the opinion that "[iut is
sufficient if a defendant who participated in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering knows that the enterprise operates by a pattern
of racketeering." ' 5
After establishing this firm foundation, the Ninth Circuit dealt
with the issue squarely in United States v. Tille. 3 6 In determining
the correct test, the court focused on the analysis provided by the
circuits that had already decided the issue and the statutory language
itself.13 7 It held that:
[t]he statutory language, however, does not require proof that a
defendant participated personally, or agreed to participate personally,
in two predicate offenses. Read in context, section 1962(d) makes it
unlawful to conspire to conduct or participate in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs, where its affairs are conducted through a pattern
of racketeering activity. 3 s
At present no decision has disagreed with or overruled this deci39
sion.1
7. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit is one of the leaders in this controversy, as
it adopted the broad approach in what is considered to be the leading
case within the majority approach in 1984, United States v. Carter.t 4 The court at that time thoroughly considered the issue at hand
in an attempt to determine whether RICO created an additional requirement in conspiracy law or whether the requirements were the
same as in federal conspiracy law.' 41 The court determined that RI133. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
134. Id. at 1216.
135. Id. at 1222.
136. 729 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
137. Id. at 619.
138. Id.
139. It appears that this circuit has not been faced with decision in the recent past as no
cases refer at all to this controversy, perhaps this is because it did explicitly adopt its
standard in Tile.
140. 721 F.2d 1514 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).

141. Id at 1528. The court stated that:
The issue thus presented is whether RICO alters general principles of federal con-
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CO was intended to mirror federal conspiracy law because to decide

otherwise would defeat Congress' purpose for adopting the provision,
which was to provide the government with better means of dealing
with the spread of organized crime. 42 As such, it was not necessary
to prove that an individual agreed to personally commit two predicate
acts.' 3 While the rationale was not fully developed, as in Neapolitan, it has provided the courts with a very clear, concise rule which
has been adhered to and cited consistently.'"
C. Deviations
The Fifth Circuit provides the only deviation from the rule,
attacking the issue by using the specific language found within the
statute itself (as opposed to adding interpretation). 4 5 It was first
used by this circuit in United States v. Elliot.'46 The court stated
that the test to be used was "[t]o be convicted as a member of an

enterprise conspiracy, an individual, by his words or actions, must
have objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or

indirectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through the commission of
two or more predicate crimes."'" This is a very flexible rule as it
allows direct proof that the defendant agreed to commit two or more

spiracy law to require that the defendant must agree to personally commit two
predicate acts, or whether consonant with federal conspiracy law a RICO conspiracy agreement consists of a defendant agreeing to participate in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs with the knowledge and intent that two predicate acts be com-

mitted.
Id.

142. Id. at 1529. The court noted that Congress was concerned with the ability to deal
with organized crime which was hampered by the currently existing statutes and procedures.
143. Id. at 1531. It did, however, state that an agreement to commit two predicate acts is
necessary if the government does not prove an agreement that the objective of the conspiracy
is to violate a RICO conspiracy provision. If the government does not prove this objective of
the conspiracy then proving an agreement to commit two predicate acts will fulfill this
requirement, and is therefore, necessary for conviction. lad
at 1530-31.
144. See United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1436 (lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214,
1228 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 871-72 (lth Cir. 1984).
Perhaps the best explanation for the less developed rationale is the fact that the case occurred
earlier and therefore there was less case law on which to rely. The court was forced to forge
its own path by looking at the brief contemplation given the issue by the other circuits that
preceded the Eleventh Circuit in ending the controversy.
145. The court uses the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), omitting very little of the
actual language. See infra note 147.
146. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
147. Id. at 903.
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crimes, while also allowing for indirect
proof that he agreed that two
4
or more crimes would be committed. 1
The Fifth Circuit further defined its position in United States v.
Sutherland.149 It held that the agreement must only show that "each
defendant must necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity."'' 0 This is very similar to what is required in a
general conspiracy context, which indicates an intent to mirror that
approach.
The court has also had occasion to consider the controversy that
currently exists between the circuits. In United States v. Manzella,"'
it noted that there was an issue as to what was required for a conspiracy conviction between the other circuits, although it decided not
to enter into the argument. 52 It would appear that it has decided to
continue application of the Elliot test, as the Fifth Circuit refused the
opportunity to join sides in the controversy in 1987.151
V.

AN ANALYSIS OF HOW TO APPROACH THE CONFLICT

In analyzing this conflict one must first begin with the actual
statute at hand, to determine whether there are any guidelines or
requirements contained within it that are useful for our analysis. Next,
attention must be given to the federal conspiracy statute, which contains the requirements as to what must be proven in a conspiracy
charge and to which § 1962(d) is subject.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

As indicated in several cases, § 1962(d) does not expressly require an agreement to personally commit two acts.' 4 In fact,
148. See id.; United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 834 (1980).
149. 656 F.2d 1181 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
150. Id at 1193. See also United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 383 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). This means that the agreement may be proved by
the use of circumstantial evidence.
151. 782 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986).
152. Id. at 537. In footnote 2 the court says that the courts of appeals are divided on
the issue of what a defendant must agree to under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). It does not deal with
the issue because it was not raised by the defendant. Id. at 537 n.2.
153. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1987).
154. See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939
(1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971
(1985); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845
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§ 1962(d) says very little.'5 5 The requirement for two predicate acts
is drawn from § 1961(5), which defines a pattern of racketeering
activity as being at least two acts.' 56 Therefore, the requirement for
two acts itself is secondhand in nature, as the primary provision does
not contain it, nor does it make reference to this section 57
Additionally, § 1962(d) does not specify what type of agreement
is necessary.'5 8 This, instead, is drawn from § 1962(c), 5 9 which is
very ambiguous. It says merely that one who participates or conducts
affairs, directly or indirectly, can be found to violate the provision.' ' This in turn is to be read in conjunction with the requirement of § 1962(d) that one conspire to take these actions.' 6' When
viewed against this background of stretched interpretation, the statute
can hardly be said to contain a requirement of personal agreement to
commit two predicate acts. The statute requires individuals to conspire, but allows them to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
activities of an organization.' 62
1. What Must the Government Prove?
The statutory language does not state that the government must
show personal agreement. What then must it show? The government
must first prove that the individual was part of the enterprise, 63
which itself is an additional requirement that does not exist in the
federal conspiracy statute."6 Then the government must show that
at least two predicate acts were committed. However, the government,
with a RICO conspiracy charge, does not have to show that there was
an overt act taken towards each goal of the conspiracy, but merely

(1984); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The acts in a conspiracy case are considered predicate acts.
They are acts that are criminal in themselves. They are to be distinguished from overt acts,
which were mentioned previously. Overt acts are preparatory in nature. They are not criminal
by themselves, but are made so only because of the criminal goal of these actions.
157. Id. § 1962(d).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 1962(c). See supra note'50 and accompanying text for the exact wording. This
is less secondhand in nature than the two act requirement because § 1962(d) does specifically
refer to § 1962(c).

160. Id. § 1962(c).
161. Id. § 1962(d).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 1961(a)-(c). Each section mentions that the individual must be doing these
prohibited activities in conjunction with an enterprise.

164. See id. § 371.
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65
the existence of the two acts and the purpose of the enterprise.
Then, to convict the defendant of conspiracy under § 1962(d), the
government has to show that the defendant agreed that these two acts
be committed.' 66 Therefore, the creation of an additional requirement of proof of the involvement in an enterprise and overt acts by
tremendous burden on the government
each individual would create a 67
conspiracy.1
RICO
a
in proving

2. Does Personal Agreement Conform to the Stated Purpose of
the Act?
The Statement of Findings and Purpose states:
[i]t
is the purpose of the Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.'"
This indicates that RICO was to be a new tool, a better, more efficient method of dealing with organized crime. The newer, more efficient remedies would enable law enforcement personnel to "catch"
more criminals. 69 In fact, Congress specifically directed that RICO
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.,' 7
Moreover, many courts have focused on this exact provision in making determinations of how to apply RICO.' In light of the fact

165. See id. § 1962(d).
166. Agreement does not have to be express; it can be implied from the actions of those
involved. See United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Joseph, 835 F.2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 89596 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 940 (1986); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
167. The statute also states that an individual involved in a pattern of racketeering

activity through an enterprise is guilty of violating these sections. This leads to the conclusion that the enterprise must be the one involved in the pattern of racketeering, and the
individual must have been involved in that enterprise during at least two acts. For conspiracy,
it is enough that the individual had made an agreement to join the enterprise. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(d).
168. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452 § 1, 84 Stat. 941
(1970).
169. See Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REv. 165 (1980).

170. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No 91-452, Title IX, § 904, 84
Stat. 941 (1970).
171. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1980); United States v.
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that Congress specifically stated that RICO was to be liberally construed, it is very difficult to imagine how a court could do otherwise.'72 While there may be a few questions about the constitutionality of this, based upon a due process attack, 173 it would appear
that a constitutional challenge would fail, as the federal conspiracy
statute has been upheld and RICO does not require any less than that
provision.'7 4
B.

Federal Conspiracy Requirements

The federal conspiracy provision is found in 18 U.S.C. § 371.
This provision is not clearly detailed and therefore it has been left to
the courts to determine what will suffice to convict an individual of
conspiracy. The courts have held that the essence of a conspiracy is
the agreement to do something unlawful. 75 The government must
also prove that there was some overt action taken towards the completion of the goal of the conspiracy. 76 The reason for punishing
the agreement was stated succinctly77 by the United States Supreme
Court in Callanan v. United States:
collective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will
be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group
association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes pos-

Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Adams. 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1986); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cer.
denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1983) (used

to define enterprise in a broad manner).
172. This is not a situation where the legislative history of the Act suggests or implicates
how Congress meant the Act to be applied. This removes the cloud of uncertainty that many
justices feel exists over the legislative history of acts. Here, the requirement is specifically
stated within the Act, although it is not included in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
174. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (upholding conspiracy liability
where one acts as the agent of the another, where that individual has not taken any steps
towards the completion of the goals of the conspiracy); United States v. Notarantonio, 758
F.2d 777, 788 (lst Cir. 1985) (overt act by one serves as overt act for all members of the
conspiracy).
175. United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992); lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 777 (1974).
176. United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hill,
971 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1992); Notarantonio, 758 F.2d at 789.
177. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
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sible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one
criminal could accomplish. 7
In fact, a coconspirator under the conspiracy statute "is liable for
the acts of his coconspirators as long as he is a member of the conspiracy."' 79 This means that once he agrees to join the conspiracy,
he is liable for all actions taken towards the eventual achievement of
their goal, even if he did not know that these actions were being
taken, or agree to them. It is important to note that the agreement to
join the conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence, just as
80
a RICO conspiracy can.1
The strictness of this requirement is exemplified in one of the
most famous conspiracy cases, Pinkerton v. United States.'8 1 In
Pinkerton, two brothers were convicted of conspiracy, even though
there was no evidence that one of the brothers had taken part in "the
commission of the substantive offenses."' 8 2 The Supreme Court held
that the gravamen of the crime was the agreement, and because he
had struck an agreement with his brother he could be guilty of conspiracy."'
C.

Comparison of RICO Conspiracy and
Conspiracy Requirements

The application of RICO in the context of the conspiracy requirements appears to be very easy. Assuming that the elements of
the enterprise have been met, the focus is whether the defendant
agreed to join the conspiracy. Since the agreement may be proven by
direct or indirect facts, this condition is easy to meet. t84
The next consideration is whether the requirement of personal
agreement is necessary at all. All the circuits have held that some

178. Id. at 593-94.
179. United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 850 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Roper, 874 F.2d 782, 787 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Once having joined a conspiracy and not
having withdrawn, the conspirator cannot insulate himself from the actions of his co-conspirator.").
180. United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 505 (1st Cir.
1990); Roper, 874 F.2d at 787; United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir.
1987); United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1986); see supra note 151
and accompanying text.
181. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
182. Id. at 645.
183. Id. at 647.
184. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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degree of acquiescence must be given by the defendant to at least
two predicate acts.1 5 Does it need to be personal agreement to
commit the acts, or merely a reaffirmation that actions towards the
goals of the enterprise be taken?
"Personal agreement" means essentially that the defendant is
obligating himself to take some overt action towards the goal. The
circuits, however, are in agreement that no overt acts are required in
a RICO conspiracy. 8 6 So what is the purpose of the defendant's
personal obligation? It cannot be to show that he has agreed to join
the enterprise, nor that he is agreeing to the goals of the enterprise,
because these requirements have already been met. Under conspiracy
law, the only other requirement is for overt acts, t87 to show that
steps are being taken to ensure the success of the conspiracy. There
appears, then, to be no logical or statutory reason for the inclusion of
this requirement by some circuits. The courts are simply adding an
additional proof requirement to the RICO conspiracy charge that
would not be required if the defendant was being charged under a
federal conspiracy theory. The courts would find that he agreed to
join a conspiracy, that the goals were unlawful, and that some steps
had been taken towards that end, although not necessarily by
him. 88 In fact, in some cases the requisite steps could not have
been taken by the defendants, yet they were still found guilty of con89
spiracy.
This interpretation also does not comport with the stated purpose
of the statute, which was to provide a broad powers to the government to combat the threat of organized crime. 9° As shown, the additional requirement of personal agreement hinders Congress' goal, by
requiring the government to show that the defendant personally agreed
to commit two acts, when all that is required is proof that he agreed
to join, and that he agreed that two acts be taken.
VI.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the absence of a provision directly requiring

185. See supra notes 64, 74, 85, 97, 104-05, 112, 124, 129, 138, 143 & 147 and
accompanying text.
186. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also supra notes
181-83 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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proof of personal agreement and the express statement that RICO is
to be liberally construed, it appears that the correct approach is the
one taken by the majority. This is because it follows the language of
the statute by not creating a requirement that is not contained within
the language of the statute. In addition, it further effectuates the purpose of the Act by providing the government with a more effective
tool to deal with organized crime.
This issue is ripe for adjudication. The controversy between the
circuits has existed for a number of years and several requests to the
Supreme Court have been made to resolve the conflict. It would
appear that by not resolving the issue, there are two systems under
which an individual may be convicted of a RICO conspiracy. In one
system, the government has a strong burden of proof where it is
required to prove that each defendant joined an enterprise, had an
intent to further the goals of the enterprise, and that each defendant
actually agreed to personally commit two acts. Logically, this does
not appear to make sense as what the defendant is being charged with
is an agreement by two or more individuals to commit illegal activities. In the other system, the government has a less strenuous burden
and must show only that the defendant was a member of the enterprise and agreed that illegal action be taken. Whether this issue will
ever be heard is a matter of speculation. In light of the recent criticisms leveled at RICO there may not be an issue at all. If, on the
other hand, RICO is upheld as constitutional, it would appear to be
of paramount importance that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and resolve the pronounced controversy among the circuit courts
regarding what type of agreement RICO requires.
Jeanette Cotting*

* The author would like to thank the Editorial Board of Volume 21 for their support
and encouragement in the publication of this Note.
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